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During the IIFET 2000 meeting, one session was set aside to discuss issues raised in an article by Richard H. Thaler entitled $From 
Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens,# in a recent (2000) issue of The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(1): 133-141. The session 
began with the following summary of some of the key arguments raised by Thaler. 
 
 
Homo Economicus will begin losing IQ, reversing a 50-
year trend 
 
After observing that writers such as Irving Fisher and John 
Maynard Keynes stressed psychological factors in their 
explanations of economic behavior, Thaler notes the trend 
toward models of rational behavior. He predicts $that this 
trend will be reversed in favor of an approach in which the 
degree of rationality bestowed to the agents depends on the 
context being discussed.# 
 
 
Homo Economicus will become a slower learner 
 
Thaler predicts $that economic models of learning will 
become more sophisticated by making their agents less 
sophisticated and giving greater weight to the role of 
environmental factors, such as the difficulty of the task and the 
frequency of feedback, in determining the speed of learning.# 
 
 
The species populating economic models will become 
more heterogeneous 
 
After observing that most economists admit that they know 
many people with flawed reasoning, Thaler suggests that in 
the future, models, which predict that rational agents always 
dominate people that try hard, but are subject to systematic 
errors, will be challenged more frequently. 
Economists will study human cognition 
 
Thaler suggests that exciting research awaits those who 
$attempt richer characterizations of human cognition.# He 
gives as an example the prospect theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky that attempts to explain why people place much 
higher values on losses than gains. We may wish to go further 
and pursue the literature review by Rabin in the first issue of 
1998 Journal of Economic Literature. 
 
 
Economists will distinguish between normative and 
descriptive theories 
 
After noting that psychologists describe theories based on 
$rational# decision making such as the expected utility 
hypothesis as normative and theories grounded on 
observations as descriptive, Thaler observes that some 
economists have developed data driven theories (e.g., 
Baumol s sales maximization hypothesis). He predicts more 
economists will seek to develop data driven theories, if they 
can consistently describe economic behavior better than 
theories grounded on rational choice.. 
 
 
Homo Economicus will become more emotional 
 
Thaler admits that many economists are already pursuing leads 
he predicts above, but suggests that emotion theory, recently 
reviewed by Jon Elster in the first issue of 1998 Journal of 
Economic Literature, has much to offer. One example is the 
failure of any attempt to contract when trials trigger the 
emotion of spite among the lawyers. He lists some emotions 
taken from Elster: anger, hatred, guilt, shame, pride, liking, 
regret, joy, grief, envy, malice, indignation, jealously, 
contempt, disgust, fear, and love. 
 
How can we use Thaler   s suggestions in fishery 
economics? 
 
Following this summary, I suggested that the following 
perplexing policy issues in fisheries might be better 
understood by pursuing some of Thaler s suggestions. 
 
￿ What is the value of (wild) salmon recovery? 
 
Hundreds of millions of dollars per year are being spent to 
save wild (non-hatchery reared) salmon in the Pacific 
Northwest. Some use the concept of existence value to justify 
the difference between these costs and the estimated level of 
benefits to use values of salmon. The testimony in public 
hearings suggest that an analysis of the emotions of those 
saving species might prove a more complete explanation. 
 
￿ Why do fishery policy analysts hold such sharply 
different and polarized views of individual fishing 
quotas (IFQs)? 
Many of the economists relying on the conventional 
neoclassical paradigm see IFQs as an invaluable solution to IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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the open access problem. Many social scientists from other 
disciplines have many concerns about the narrowness of the 
economic analysis. Are any of the suggestions from Thaler 
helpful in the critique of the economist s standard framework? 
 
￿ Why and when do fishers comply with regulations? 
 
Sutinen and his colleagues suggest that conventional studies of 
compliance overestimate fishers  evasion of regulations and 
that inclusion of social characteristics provides a much richer 
ability to predict compliance. Is compliance an emotional 
issue? Might Elster s work help us understand compliance? 
 
￿ How do we allocate fisheries (commercial vs. 
recreational, gear type, ethnic groups, etc.)? 
 
The standard economic explanation of allocation is to allocate 
resources to maximize net economic value. Does this explain 
the special treatment for traditional fishing groups including 
aboriginal people? Does public support for life-style 
considerations in allocation have a connection to emotional 
response to fishery management? 
 
￿ What is the market for super (genetically modified) 
salmon? 
 
Scientists suggest that the public fear of genetically modified 
foods is not founded in objective analysis of risks. Do we need 
an analysis that includes emotions? 
 
￿ Why and when should displaced fishers, riparian 
landowners, etc. receive compensation? 
 
Neoclassical economic analysis suggests that compensation 
decisions should be grounded in the costs and benefits of such 
programs including incentives to underinvest and overinvest 
as well as transaction costs. Is this literature an adequate guide 
to the political process? If not, does any of the literature 
identified by Thaler help us understand the recent surge of 
license buyback programs and disaster relief programs? 
 
￿ How do fishers respond to a rapid decline in fishing 
opportunities? 
 
At a meeting on limited access systems several years ago, 
Philip Meyer argued that the problem with many fisheries is 
not entry and whether it should be limited, but rather the 
difficulty of limited exit. Anthropologists and sociologists have 
been analyzing the response to reduced fishing opportunities 
by explaining difficult family and personal adjustments. Does 
the standard economic paradigm as used in studies of labor 
economics and rural economic development provide adequate 
guidance for fishery economists or do we need to pursue 
literature identified by Thaler? 